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COMMENT

der the fourteenth amendment 2 was not "specially
set up or claimed" under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,1 which
gave the Supreme Court review over state courts
in specified circumstances. Justice Rehnquist concluded, in dissent, that the constitutional issue was
not before the state high court, thus, blocking
Supreme Court jurisdiction on state procedural
grounds.
'2410 U.S. at 313. One of Chambers' grounds for
appeal was:
The trial of the Defendant was not in accord with
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States....
463 Id. Final judgements or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(3) By writ of certiorari.., where any title, right,
privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of,
or commission held or authority exercised under
the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948).
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Indeed, the Chambers Court was hesitant to come
to terms with the voucher rule and the rule excluding declarations against penal interests as hearsay,
individually. Perhaps this hesitancy was due to a
reluctance to "constitutionalize the intricacies of
the common law of evidence."54 The Court held that
the voucher rule and the rule making declarations
against penal interest inadmissible as hearsay,
taken together under the circumstances of this
case, rendered Chambers' trial unfair, denying him
due process. The Court also used critical language
in discussing these two evidentiary rules. Perhaps
the holding and the language used against these
evidentiary rules in Chambers indicates the beginning of a trend that one day may lead to a renunciation of these two evidentiary rules whose rationale, and indeed function, belong to a bygone
age.

" See note 45 supra.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Guilty Pleas
Guilty pleas continue to present a miscellany of
problems to federal and state appellate courts.
Considering the consequences of a guilty plea, the
Ninth Circuit in Mann v. Smith reviewed a California case in which the defendant pleaded guilty
to possession of marijuana only after his motion to
suppress the evidence had been denied. Following
Tollet v. Henderson and McMann v. Richardson,3
the court held that a defendant who pleads guilty
to state charges has no right to challenge his conviction by federal habeas corpus on any grounds
except improvidency of the plea through absence,
or incompetent advice, of a lawyer. In response to
Mann's fourth amendment argument, the court
held: "There can be no federal collateral attack
based upon an alleged violation of constitutional
rights occurring prior to the guilty plea." 4
The dissent argued that Tollett and McMann do
not preclude giving effect to special state statutes
which preserve the right to appeal certain issues
despite the guilty plea. The dissent pointed out that
in a pre-Tollett case 5 the Second Circuit did give
effect to such statutes.
'13 BNA CR. L. REP. 2425 (9th Cir. July 6, 1973).

2411 U.S. 258 (1973).

3 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
4 13 BNA Ca. L. R.xp. at 2426.
5Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967).

In Boykin v. Alabama6 the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional rights which are waived
by a guilty plea. Applying Boykin, recent court decisions such as McChesney v. Henderson? and Merrill v. State indicate that the judge need not expressly enunciate these rights to the defendant.
Nor need the defendant expressly waive these
rights at the time of his guilty plea. Nonetheless,
the record must indicate that the accused's plea
was intelligently and voluntarily made, with knowledge of the consequences. The Fifth' and Tenth"°
Circuits have held that misinformation about sentencing does not necessarily invalidate a guilty
plea. In contrast, the Third Circuit in United
States v. Jasper" recently allowed a bank. robbery
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because he
was given misinformation about the maximum
sentence, was told incorrectly that the sentence
could be pyramided, and was apparently never advised of just what the government would have to
prove to establish his guilt on each of the separate
6395 U.S. 238 (1969).
7 482 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1973).
' 206 N.W.2d 828 (S.D. 1973).
9 United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.
1970).
10Murray v. United States, 419 F.2d 1076 (10th Cir.
1969).
11481 F.2d 976 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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counts. This context was not consistent with a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
In People v. Martin12 the California supreme
court dealt with the consequences of the defendant's agreement to have the issue of his guilt
determined on the basis of his preliminary hearing
transcript. Such a submission has been equated
with a guilty plea for some purposes-for protecting the defendant's rights to adequate warning of
what he is waiving. But in Marlin the court held
that a submission on the transcript does not preclude appeal based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Unlike a guilty plea, the submission does not
warrant the finding of an implied admission of the
existence of each element of a charged crime. The
submission is no more than waiver of jury trialan attempt to save the court's time in hopes of a
lenient sentence.
In determining whether a defendant was competent to plead guilty, at least two state courts
recently used the standard of competency to stand
trial. In People v. Harrington," a Michigan appellate court said that the circumstances of the guilty
plea and of the hearing which determined competency to stand trial did "not as a matter of law
preclude the possibility of a voluntary plea." 11
And the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court
explicitly stated in Commonwealth v. MorrouA5 that
the same standard used to determine competency
to stand trial "should be applied to the acceptance
of a guilty plea." 16
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Sielig v. .Eymnan 7 held that a defendant who is competent to
stand trial may nevertheless be incompetent to
understand the rights he waives in a guilty plea. In
this case, psychiatrists had examined the defendant
to determine whether he could stand trial. The
court extended Westbrook v. Arizona l to hold that
when a question of mental capacity lurks in the
background, the trial court must make an inquiry
and a finding on the criminal defendant's competency to plead guilty. Furthermore, the reviewing
court cannot use the "objective" waiver test; that
is, the court cannot simply examine the record as
"2

Cal. 3d -, 511 P.2d 1161, 108 Cal. Rptr. 809

(1973).
1345 Mich. App. 549, 206 N.W.2d 748 (1973).
14Id. at 550, 206 N.W.2d at 749.
15296 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. 1973).
16 296 N.E.2d at. 468.
'7478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
18384 U.S. 150 (1966) (held that.tompetency to stand

trial-assist counsel-did not suffice as competency to
waivea *ight to counsel at trial).

it could in the typical case of the presumably competent defendant.
There are implications in Sielig that the standard
is higher for waiving a constitutional right (e.g.,
self-incrimination) than for being judged competent to stand trial. The court adopted this
standard:
A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a
mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the altematives presented to him and to understand the
nature of the consequences of his plea.19
In remanding to the state court, the Ninth Circuit
said that the records submitted by the medical
experts (regarding competency to stand trial) a
month before the guilty plea might be sufficient
to support a finding of competency to plead guilty.
Plea Bargaining
A plea bargain does not render a guilty plea involuntary, but the agreement must be upheld by
the parties to the agreement. Several federal and
state appellate courts have recently spoken to the
problem of breaking or bungling the iromises made
during plea bargaining.
A Michigan appellate court held that when a
judge actively participated in the plea bargaining
process, his failure to honor the agreement was reviewable.2 In this case the defendant had overheard one end of the telephone conversation in
which his lawyer, the judge and an assistant prosecuting attorney apparently agreed on a five year
minimum sentence. When the judge imposed a ten
year minimum, the defendant asked for a vacation
of the plea or, alternatively, that he be sentenced
according to the original bargain. The appellate
court ordered resentencing.
In Troupe v. Rowe," a plea-bargaining prosecutor
was limited by the bargain and by the sentence,
even through the judge was more lenient than the
prosecutor requested. The state, after sentencing,
prevailed on the judge to reopen the matter, reject
the guilty plea (made pursuant to a plea bargain),
and proceed to trial (which resulted in a harsher
sentence). The reviewing court held that the original sentencing was complete, that the "rehearing"
was not just a "resumption" of the earlier trial,
18478 F.2d at 215. The court adopts this standard
from judge Hufstedler's dissent in Schoeller v. Dunbar,
423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970).
20People v. Stevens, 45 Mich. App. 689, 206 N.W.2d
757 (1973).
"283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973).
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and that the new state's attorney should not have
been allowed to reopen the case after a recess. The
court granted petitioner's mandamus to void the
harsher sentence. Increase in sentence here constituted double jeopardy.
The prosecutor in Correalev. United Statesn was
in good faith but bungled the execution of a plea
bargain. He recommended a sentence which was illegal and which could not fulfill the bargain, i.e.,
could not effectively run concurrently with a state
sentence which the defendant was already serving.
When the prosecutor realized he had miscalculated
the years, he made belated and cryptic suggestions
to the judge, who did not realize that this new recommendation was different from the former one.
On review, the First Circuit said:
While we do not go so far as to say that minor and
harmless slips by prosecutors will void a plea bargain, we hold that, at a minimum, a prosecutor may
not, in exchange for a guilty plea, promise and/or
make a recommendation of an illegal sentence.Y
The court fashioned an equitable remedy similar
to specific performance of the original plea bargain.
Since the defendant had already served more than
the recommended time, the court vacated the sentence, remanded for immediate resentencing, specified the years, suspended the execution of the sentence, and specified the years of probation.
Prosecutors must also uphold certain informal
promises to defendants. For example, in People v.
Brunner,24 the state covertly promised not to prosecute one of Charles Manson's girl friends if she
would testify in the trials of the more reprehensible
offenders. Her contradictory confessions, recantations and sur-recantations were impeached at trial;
nevertheless, the defendants were convicted. Noting that perjury indictments were pending, the
California supreme court dismissed the murder case
against her. She had upheld her part of the bargain,
and the state was estopped from arguing non-compliance.
While it is indisputable that the People can bargain only for testimony and not for results, the
issue here is not the validity of the bargain but the
extent of a party's performance under the bargain. Performance can be measured, at least in
part, by results. Since the People got their hopedfor results through the use of Brunner's testimony,
we conclude, albeit somewhat pragmatically, that
2 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973).
= Id. at 947.
2413 BNA CR. L. REP. 2372 (Cal. June 26, 1973).
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enough of the bargain was kept to make it operative.25
The court also held that the immunity-from-prosecution bargain was valid even though it was not
made pursuant to statutory procedure. The court
hints that it might have been more sympathetic to
the prosecutor if he had followed the statute which
provided that the terms of a promise of immunity
should appear dearly on the record and be supported by a court order.
Airport Searches

Recent United States circuit court decisions on
the legality of airport searches focus on several key
issues: (1) whether the search is a private, administrative or police search; (2) assuming the
fourth amendment is relevant, what test of reasonableness should be used for warrantless airport
searches; (3) whether the hijack menace itself can
justify otherwise illegal searches; (4) whether the
test should vary according to the time and place
and according to whether the search is of the
person or the luggage; (5) what facts suffice to
meet a given test: merely being a prospective
passenger, fitting the statistical hijack profile,
activating the magnetometer, failing to produce
adequate identification or acting "suspiciously";
(6) whether consent is a necessary accompaniment,
an unnecessary frill or sufficient independent
ground for the search; (7) what constitutes consent-in-fact-merely being in the boarding area
amidst posters and announcements of an imminent
search, being aware (or perhaps even individually
warned) of the right not to consent (and hence, not
to fly); (8) whether the consent is voluntary; (9)
whether one can "voluntarily" consent when the
choices are so limited, whether one is denied his
constitutional right to travel by being forced to
choose between being searched and not boarding
the plane at all.
Since the decisions seem to turn on the particular
fact situation, each case will be discussed separately. The legality of routine search of all luggage
was the issue in United States v.Anderson.26 The
defendant appealed his conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon, which had been discovered in a
briefcase during a security check at the loading
gate.
First, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
extensive government involvement (Federal Aviation Administration regulations, use of Customs
25
26

Id.at __,__ P.2d at __, -. Cal. Rptr. at 13 BNA CR. L. REP. 2373 (9th Cir. June 29, 1973).
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Service agents and federal marshals, etc.) rendered
the searches subject to fourth amendment limitations.= Thus it was irrelevant that this particular
search was conducted by a private airline employee rather than a public official. The search
still had to meet a fourth amendment test.
In determining which test to use, the court rejected the government's argument that the search
was legal because the passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his
luggage." To countenance this argument would
be to say that the government could avoid the
fourth amendment by notifying the public that all
telephone lines are tapped. The court said that
airport searches "are not outside the Fourth
Amendment simply because they are being con0
ducted at all airports." 1 The routine nature of
airport searches does not mean that all passengers have waived the reasonable expectation of
privacy.
The court also rejected the stop-and-frisk standards from Terry v. Ohio" and Adams v. Williams2
since they were concerned with justification for
individual searches. In contrast, the airport search
here was indiscriminate-not directed against the
defendant as an individual. The airline employee
had no individualized basis for the search at all;
he certainly had no "articulable facts" on which to
suspect this passenger of possible criminal activity.
The court finally decided that airport searches
are "adiministrative" " searches made pursuant to
a general regulatory scheme. The test for administrative searches is the fourth amendment's standard of reasonableness. This means that the screening of all passengers may be sufficient in scope to
detect the presence of weapons or explosives but
must be limited in its intrusiveness as is consistint
contrast, the Eighth Circuit is split over whether
2In
searches by airline agents are private (invulnerable to
fourth amendment attack when conducted by the airline for its own purpose and without instigation or participation by government officers) or government (controlled by the fourth amendment). United States v.
Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1973).
28But see State v. Fellows, - Ariz. __, 511 P.2d 636
(1973) for a state court holding that a 1971 search by
airline employee (who then informed officers) was not
governmental and hence was not proscribed by the
fourth or fourteenth amendment.
29The government had cited Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
30 13 BNA CR. L. REP. at 2396.
"1392 U.S. 1 (1968).
407 U.S. 143 (1972
3People v. Kluga, 108 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App.
1973) deems as "administrative" the United States
marshal's search of passengers with high magnetometer
readings. But this decision does not stress the necessity
for consent.

with satisfaction of the administrative need that
justifies it. It follows that airport screening
searches are valid only if they recognize the right of
a person to avoid search by electing not to board
the aircraft."
He must consent. Furthermore, if the person elects
not to board, then any search would be a criminal
investigation subject to warrant and probable
cause requirements.
The court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant had consented
to the search. Since the search occurred in 1971
before the screening process was so well publicized,
there is the possibility that no consent-in-fact will
be found. However, the court hints that in 1973,
the publicity, posters and notices probably would
notify the passenger of his alternatives and would
render his attempt to board as a consent-and a
voluntary one which would pass muster under
5
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.3
The court believes that its decision is completely
consistent with the defendant's right to travel. He
may submit to the search as a condition to boarding, or he may turn around and leave. If he chooses
to proceed to the screening area, he has relinquished
his option to leave or, alternatively, he has submitted to the search. Either way, it is essentially
a "consent" granting the government a license to
do what would otherwise be barred by the fourth
amendment.
In United States v. Ruiz-Estrelia,31 the Second
Circuit considered the legality of searching a passenger simply because he fit the hijack profile.
The passenger involved had neither passed through
the magnetometer nor done anything at all suspicious. On the basis of the ticket agent's identifying the passenger as fitting the Federal Aviation
Administration hijack profile, a federal sky marshal
took him behind closed doors, asked him for identification (in which there were some minor discrepancies), and then either asked or told the defendant
to submit to a baggage search. The court held that
the shotgun found in the shopping bag should have
been suppressed from evidence as the fruit of an
illegal search.
The government conceded that the seizure was
not predicated on fourth amendment probable
cause. Disagreeing with the other arguments posed
by the prosecution, the court said:
(1) The Terry v. Ohio" rationale was inapplicable
"13 BNA Ca. L. Rp,. at 2396.
"412 U.S. 218 (1973).
'p481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
'7392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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here. The court has used the Terry less-than-probable-cause test in Bell v. United Statesm where the
suspect met the profile and also activated the
magnetometer, produced no identification and
admitted to a criminal history. These circumstances, which sufficed to justify a limited pat-down
frisk in Bell, did not obtain in this case. Also, the
court refused to accept the trial court's reasoning
that the passenger would have set off the magnetometer if he had passed through it.
(2) Chief judge Friendly's theory39 that the
hijacking danger could itself justify a limited airport search was not applicable here, since the
theory was conditioned on the passenger's awareness that he could avoid search by avoiding the
flight. No one made Ruiz-Estrella aware of any
such option. (The court broadly implied that posters will never suffice to create the presumption of
awareness on the part of the passenger.)
(3) The search could not be based on defendant's
consent unless the consent was voluntarily given.
The court reviewed the recent Supreme Court
discussion of voluntary consent to a search. In
Sclmcckloth v. BustanonteO the Court declined to
hold that the suspect must be made specifically
aware of his right to refuse to consent. Rather, the
Court emphasized that the prosecutor has the
burden of proving the consent was freely and voluntarily given, that the question of voluntariness
must be resolved through examination of the
"totality of all the surrounding circumstances," 41
that voluntariness can be shown without a demonstration that the defendant knew of his right to
refuse, but that the prosecutor's burden cannot be
met merely by showing acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority.2 Bustamonte found voluntariness
more easily when the interrogation and search did
not take place in some inherently coercive environment like a remote station house. Distinguishing
Bustamonte on the facts, the court in Ruiz-Estrella
felt that the closed side room at the airport provided a traditional custodial situation. The court
said that the defendant was merely acquiescing to
apparently lawful authority, not voluntarily consenting.
It would appear that courts can avoid a Bustanmonte finding of voluntariness by finding some
coercive element in the circumstances or in the
mind of the defendant. Also, courts can fail even to
Is464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972).
39Id., (Friendly, C. J., concurring).
40412 U.S. 218 (1973).
1Id. at 227.
12 Id. at 233.
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reach the Bustamonte question of voluntariness by
refusing to find consent-in-fact. For example, the
court could decide that passing by posters and
announcements is not tantamount to consent."
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Krol144
found no grounds for the search and no consent to
it. The passenger fit the hijack profile, and the
metal hinges on his briefcase activated the magnetometer. He tried to keep the file section of his
briefcase closed, and he shifted the position of the
case as the federal marshal approached. On appeal,
the court upheld the trial judge's finding that the
gestures concurrent with the examination of the
briefcase did not supply a sufficient evidentiary
justification for believing that the defendant was
transporting explosives or weapons.
The court avoided dealing with the question of
whether the hijack menace in itself justified a
general search of carry-on luggage!.- But the court
did find it unreasonable to search a 9" X 4" envelope with a X" X 2" bulge-too small to be an
explosive or weapon. Besides, the federal marshal
did not clear the area of other persons before he
asked the defendant to open the envelope. Thus
the marshal's objective behavior indicated that he
was searching for contraband, not for nitroglycerine
as he professed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's suppression from evidence of the
amphetamines found in the envelope.
Regarding the government's argument that the
passenger consented simply by passing the notices
posted on the way to the boarding area, the court
said:
Compelling the defendant to choose between exercising Fourth Amendment rights and his right to
travel constitutes coercion; the government cannot
be said to have established that the defendant
freely and voluntarily consent [sic] to the search
when to do otherwise would have meant foregoing
the constitutional right to travel."
43See United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723,
728 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rivera, 13 BNA CR.
L. REP. 2234 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 1973) for indications
that posters may not suffice for consent, much less for
voluntary consent.
44 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
15 See United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408,414 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J.,concurring) for a statement
that exigencies do not make an airport into an enclave
immune from fourth amendment restrictions.
46481 F.2d at 886. The court does not mention
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), which
was announced one month earlier. Rather, the court
cites United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284,
1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972) which in turn cited United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) for
recognizing that the government cannot "condition the
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United States v. Legato dealt with a search of a
passenger who had left the airport when he heard
an announcement of a general baggage search.
There had been an anonymous tip about a bomb
in an orange shopping bag. There was suspicious
behavior by the defendants when the FBI agent
approached: one man was holding a ticket issued
to an assumed name, and the other denied having
sat with his companion-even denied knowing him.
At trial, the defendants challenged the admissibility of the heroin discovered in the shopping bag.
The Fifth Circuit refused to subject the tip to
the Aguilar-Spinelli3 tests of informer reliability.
The court said those tests were appropriate for
probable cause for arrest or warrant but not for
cases (like this one) following Terry. The court used
the Terry-Adams stop-and-frisk standard to justify
the pat-down although this man had left the terminal and was apparently no longer intending to
board the flight. To justify the further search of the
shopping bag, the court cited its own decision in
United States v. Moreno,'9 which extended Terry to
recognize that public danger made the airport into
a "critical zone where special fourth amendment
considerations apply." 10 (Apparently the bomb
danger also extends to any location chosen by the
passenger who exercises his option of not boarding
the plane.)
To meet a possible objection that the Terry
rationale can support a pat-down but not a baggage
search, the court offered alternate grounds, viz.
consent. The defendants had been given Miranda
warnings, and there was no evidence of coercion.
exercise of the constitutional right to travel on the
voluntary relinquishment of Fourth Amendment
rights," 351 F. Supp. at 1288. The Kroll court overlooks
the fact that United States v. Meulener went on to say
that the fourth amendment can be satisfied if the passenger is advised "that he has to submit to a search if he
wants to board the plane but that he can decline to be
searched if he chooses not to board the aircraft." 351 F.
Supp. at 1290.
4 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
43 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1968);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
49475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
50Id.at 51.

Since the search was not conducted near the boarding area, there was no discussion of whether passing
the posters amounted to consent. Nor was there a
reference to Bustamonte considerations of voluntariness.
The Fifth Circuit continued to approve airport
searches in United States v. Skipwith.51 Analogizing
the boarding area to the area near a foreign border,
the court held that "those who actually present
themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like those
seeking entrance into the country, are subject to a
search based on mere or unsupported suspicion." 12
The defendant in this case met the Federal Aviation Administration profile, stated that he had no
identification and used a false name on a ticket. A
United States marshal ordered him to empty his
pockets, purportedly to determine whether a bulge
was in fact a gun. The court affirmed the conviction for possession of cocaine, saying that the discovery of the cocaine was not a "windfall" but the
"product of valid police work."
Both the dissent and majority agreed in rejecting
the rule in United States v. MeulenerM that a passenger can freely withdraw from the boarding area
once he has entered it. They feel that such a rule
would increase the danger of hijacking by reducing
the risk, i.e., whenever a search was announced,
the potential hijacker could just walk out of one
boarding area and perhaps into another.
In dissent, visiting Judge Aldrich argued that
special safeguards should guarantee that the loose
standards for airport searches not be abused. The
inspectors should not be encouraged to use the
airport circumstances as a pretext to look for contraband such as illegal drugs. Judge Aldrich argued
for an exception to the general exclusionary rule:
"viable use.., should not be made of proceeds towards which the search was not, and could not have
been independently directed." 11
51482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
*2Id. at 1276.
3
1 Id. at 1278.
11351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
85 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272,1280 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
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